# Fair Representation Learning 

## Apr 10, 2020 <br> Dr. Wei Wei, Prof. James Landay

CS 335: Fair, Accountable, and Transparent (FAccT) Deep Learning Stanford University

## Updated Project Policies

- Maximum Number of Students For Course Projects
- We now allow up to 3 students in a project
- Project Sharing
- Project sharing between classes can be done under the permissions from the Instructors
- Reminder: Project Proposal Deadline
- Apr 22, before class
- Less than two weeks from now


## Recaps From the Previous Lecture

- Fairness Through Unawareness

Outcomes: Fair ML Model
Indirect Discrimination


R-Race
S = Skills
Y - Years of Exp
O = Often Goes to Mexico Market

## Limitations

- Processing Sensitive Features
- Fairness through unawareness requires sensitive features to be masked out
- Not easy to do in real life
- Referred to as individual fairness criteria



## * Stereotypical dataset

The physician hired the secretary because he was overwhelmed with clients.
The physician hired the secretary because she was highly recommended.

* Anti-stereotypical dataset

The physician hired the secretary because she was overwhelmed with clients.

The physician hired the secretary because he was highly recommended.

## Outline

- Major Fairness Criteria
- Demographic Parity
- Equality of Odds/Opportunity
- FICO Case Study
- Fair Representation Learning
- Prejudice Removing Regularizer


## Demographic Parity

- Demographic Parity Is Applied to a Group of Samples
- Does not require features to be masked out
- A Predictor Y Satisfies Demographic Parity If
- The probabilities of positive predictions are the same regardless of whether the group is protected
- Protected groups are identified as $\mathrm{A}=1$

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
$$

## Comparisons

Individual Treatment


Fairness Through Unawareness
$P(\hat{Y} \mid X)$

Group Treatment

Protected Features = 1


Demographic Parity

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)
$$

Protected
Features $=0$


Demographic Parity

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
$$

## Graphical Model Explanations

Individual Treatment
Group Treatment

$P(H \mid O, Y, S)$

$P(H=1 \mid R=1)$

$=\quad P(H=1 \mid R=0)$

## SAT Score Prediction



## Issues With Demographic Parity

- Correlates Too Much With the Performance of the Predictor

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
$$



## Issues With Demographic Parity

- Correlates Too Much With the Performance of the Predictor



## Equality of Odds (Hardt et al, 2016)

- Equal Probabilities for Both Qualified/Unqualified People Across Protected Groups

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y)
$$



## Equality of Opportunity (Hardt et al, 2016)

- Equal Probabilities for Qualified People Across Protected Groups

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y=1)
$$



## Case Study on FICO

- FICO Dataset
- 301,536 TransUnion TransRisk scores from 2003
- Scores ranges from 300 to 850
- People were labeled as in default if they failed to pay a debt for at least 90 days
- Protected attribute $A$ is race, with four values: \{Asian, white non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and black\}


## FICO Scores

- 18\% Default Rate on Any Accounts Corresponds to a 2\% Default Rate for New Loans

Non-default rate by FICO score


CDF of FICO score by group


## Making Lending Decisions Without Discriminating

- Requirement: Default Rate < 18\%, Simple Threshold Model
- Max Profit - No Fairness Constraints
- Race Blind - Using the same threshold for all race groups


## Making Lending Decisions Without Discriminating

- Requirement: Default Rate < 18\%, Simple Threshold Model
- Max Profit - No Fairness Constraints
- Race Blind - Using the same threshold for all race groups
- Demographic Parity
- Fraction of the group members that qualify for the loan are the same

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \quad A=0)
$$

## Making Lending Decisions Without Discriminating

- Requirement: Default Rate $<\mathbf{1 8 \%}$, Simple Threshold Model
- Max Profit - No Fairness Constraints
- Race Blind - Using the same threshold for all race groups
- Demographic Parity
- Fraction of the group members that qualify for the loan are the same

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid \underline{A=1})=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
$$

- Equal Opportunity
- Fraction of non-defaulting group members that qualify for the loan is the same

$$
P(\underline{Y}=1 \mid A=0, \underline{Y=1)}=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y=1)
$$

## Making Lending Decisions Without Discriminating

- Requirement: Default Rate < 18\%, Simple Threshold Model
- Max Profit - No Fairness Constraints
- Race Blind - Using the same threshold for all race groups
- Demographic Parity
- Fraction of the group members that qualify for the loan are the same

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \quad A=0)
$$

- Equal Opportunity
- Fraction of non-defaulting group members that qualify for the loan is the same
- Equal Odds

$$
P(\underline{Y}=1 \mid A=0, \underline{Y=1})=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, \underline{Y=1)}
$$

- Fraction of both non-defaulting and defaulting groups of members that quality for the loan is the same

$$
P(\underline{Y}=1 \mid A=0, \underline{Y})=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, \underline{Y})
$$

## Credit Modeling Using A Single Threshold

- Within-Group Percentile Differs Dramatically for Each Group




## Found Thresholds for Each Fairness Definitions




## Identifying Non-Defaulters

Per-group ROC curve



## Non-Defaulters and Max Profits



## Practice Question

- Find out the Fairness Criteria that $\hat{Y} 1$, and $\hat{Y} 2$ Satisfy
- $A=\{r a c e\}, Y=\{$ Hiring Decision $\}$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=2 / 3$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=2 / 3$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Vemographics Parity } \\
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
\end{gathered}
$$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=0.5$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=0.5$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=0$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=0.5$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=0$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=1$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 1$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=0.5$

准quality of Opportunity

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y=1)
$$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=0$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=1$

XEquality of Odds

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y)
$$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=1 / 3$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Demographic Parity for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H)=2 / 3$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W)=1 / 3$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { XDemographics Parity } \\
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)
\end{gathered}
$$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=y e s)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor $\hat{Y} 2$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=0$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Equality of Opportunity/Odds for Predictor Y2

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=$ yes $)=1 / 2$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=y e s)=1 / 2$

Equality of Opportunity

$$
P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y=1)
$$

- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=H, Y=n o)=1$
- $P(\hat{Y} 1=1 \mid R=W, Y=n o)=0$

XEquality of Odds
$P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y)$

| Race and <br> Ethnicity | Skill | Years of <br> Exp | Goes to <br> Mexican <br> Markets? | Hiring <br> Decision Y | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{1}$ | Predictor <br> $\hat{Y}_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hispanic | Javascript | 1 | yes | no | 0 | 1 |
| Hispanic | C++ | 5 | yes | yes | 1 | 1 |
| Hispanic | Python | 1 | no | yes | 1 | 0 |
| White | Java | 2 | no | yes | 0 | 0 |
| White | C++ | 3 | no | yes | 1 | 1 |
| White | C++ | 0 | no | no | 1 | 0 |

## Summary of Fairness Criteria

| Fairness Criteria | Criteria | Group | Individual |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unawareness | Excludes A in Predictions |  | $\checkmark$ |
| Demographic Parity | $P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1)$ |  |  |
| Equalized Odds | $P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y)$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Equalized Opportunity | $P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=0, Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1 \mid A=1, Y=1)$ | $\checkmark$ |  |

## Outline

- Major Fairness Criteria
- Demographic Parity
- Equality of Odds/Opportunity

FICO Case Study

- Fair Representation Learning
- Prejudice Removing Regularizer


## Fair Representation Learning

- Make Representations Fair
- Ensure fairness up to a certain level



## Prejudice Remover Regularizer (Kamishima et al, 2012)

- Quantified Causes of Unfairness
- Prejudice
- Unfairness rooted in the dataset
- Underestimation
- Model unfairness because the model is not fully converged
- Negative Legacy
- Unfairness due to sampling biases
- Training Objective

$$
-\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{D} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta})+\eta \mathrm{R}(\mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\Theta})+\frac{\lambda}{2}\|\boldsymbol{\Theta}\|_{2}^{2}
$$

Loss of the Model
Fairness Regularizer
L2 Regularizer

## Prejudice Index (PI)

- Recall that Indirect Discrimination Happens When
- Prediction is not directly conditioned on sensitive variables $S$
- Prediction is indirectly conditioned on $S$ by a variable $O$ that is dependent on $S$
- $P(\hat{Y} \mid O)$, and $O \sim P(O \mid S)$
- Prejudice Index (PI)
- Measures the degree of indirect discrimination based on mutual information

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 0.70 \\
& 0.00 \\
& \mathrm{PI}=\sum_{(y, s) \in \mathcal{D}} \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y, s] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y, s]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y] \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[s]}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Normalized Prejudice Index (NPI)

- Prejudice Index (PI)
- Measures the degree of indirect discrimination based on mutual information
- Ranges in $[0,+\infty)$

$$
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{(y, s) \in \mathcal{D}} \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y, s] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y, s]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y] \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[s]}
$$

- Normalized Prejudice Index (NPI)
- Normalize PI by the entropy of $Y$ and $S$
- Ranges in [0, 1]

$$
\mathrm{NPI}=\mathrm{PI} /(\sqrt{\mathrm{H}(Y) \mathrm{H}(S)})
$$

## Optimizing PI

- Learning PI

$$
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{Y, S} \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y, S] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y, S]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[S] \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y]}
$$

## Optimizing PI

- Learning PI

Expands $\operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{S})$ into $\Sigma_{\mathrm{x}} \operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{S})$


- Using Logistic Regression Model as the Prediction Model

$$
\mathcal{M}[y \mid \mathbf{x}, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}]=y \sigma\left(\mathbf{x}^{\top} \mathbf{w}_{s}\right)+(1-y)\left(1-\sigma\left(\mathbf{x}^{\top} \mathbf{w}_{s}\right)\right)
$$

## Optimizing PI

- Learning PI

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{Y, S} \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y, S] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y, S]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[S] \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y]} & =\sum_{X, S} \tilde{\operatorname{Pr}}[X, S] \sum_{Y} \mathcal{M}[Y \mid X, S ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y, S]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[S] \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[Y]} . \\
& =\sum_{\left.\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y]} .
\end{aligned}
$$

- Using Logistic Regression Model as the Prediction Model

$$
\mathcal{M}[y \mid \mathbf{x}, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}]=y \sigma\left(\mathbf{x}^{\top} \mathbf{w}_{s}\right)+(1-y)\left(1-\sigma\left(\mathbf{x}^{\top} \mathbf{w}_{s}\right)\right)
$$

## Optimizing PI

$$
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y]}
$$

## Optimizing PI

$$
\begin{gathered}
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}[y]}} \\
\hat{\operatorname{Pr}[y \mid s]=\int_{\text {dom }(X)} \operatorname{Pr}^{*}[X \mid s] \mathcal{M}[y \mid X, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}] d X} \begin{array}{l}
\text { Integrals Are Difficult to Evaluate }
\end{array} \text { }
\end{gathered}
$$

## Optimizing PI

$$
\begin{gathered}
\operatorname{PI}=\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}[y]}} \\
\hat{\operatorname{Pr}[y \mid s]}=\int_{\operatorname{dom}(X)} \operatorname{Pr}^{*}[X \mid s] \mathcal{M}[y \mid X, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}] d X \\
\approx \frac{\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D} \text { s.t. } s_{i}=s} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right]}{\mid\left\{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D} \text { s.t. } s_{i}=s\right\} \mid} \\
\text { Approximating integrals by sample means }
\end{gathered}
$$

## Optimizing PI

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{PI}=\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}[y]}} \\
& \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y \mid s]=\int_{\operatorname{dom}(X)} \operatorname{Pr}^{*}[X \mid s] \mathcal{M}[y \mid X, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}] d X \quad \hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y] \approx \frac{\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right]}{|\mathcal{D}|} \\
& \approx \frac{\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D} \text { s.t. } s_{i}=s} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right]}{\left.\mid\left\{\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D} \text { s.t. } s_{i}=s\right\} \mid} \\
& \text { Approximating integrals by sample means }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Putting Things Together

- Optimization Target

$$
-\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{D} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta})+\eta \mathrm{R}(\mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\Theta})+\frac{\lambda}{2}\|\boldsymbol{\Theta}\|_{2}^{2}
$$

Loss of the Model Fairness Regularizer L2 Regularizer

- Fairness Regularizer

$$
\mathrm{PI}=\sum_{\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{y \in\{0,1\}} \mathcal{M}\left[y \mid \mathbf{x}_{i}, s_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\Theta}\right] \ln \frac{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}\left[y \mid s_{i}\right]}{\hat{\operatorname{Pr}}[y]}
$$

## Adult Income Dataset (Kohavi 1996)




## Adult Income Dataset (Kohavi 1996)



## Results

- Changes of Performance With $\eta$
- Model performance decreases (Acc)
- Discrimination Decreases (NPI)
- "Fairness Efficiency" (PI/MI) Increases



## Adult Income Dataset (Kohavi 1996)

- Predict Whether Income Exceeds \$50K/yr Based on Census Data



## Adult Income Dataset (Kohavi 1996)




## Results

- Prejudice Prior Sacrifices Model Performance
- PR has lower Acc (Accuracy)
- PR has lower NMI (normalized mutual information between labels and predictions)
- Prejudice Prior Makes Model Fair
- PR has lower NPI

|  | method | Acc | NMI | NPI | PI/MI |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Logistic Regression <br> fulf fet. <br> Logistic Regression <br> no sensitive fet.$\longrightarrow$ LR | 0.851 | 0.267 | $5.21 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $2.10 \mathrm{E}-01$ |  |
| Logisitic Regression + <br> Prejudice Regularizer$\longrightarrow$ PRns | 0.850 | 0.266 | $4.91 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.99 \mathrm{E}-01$ |  |
|  | PR $\eta=5$ | 0.842 | 0.240 | $4.24 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.91 \mathrm{E}-01$ |
| PR $\eta=15$ | 0.801 | 0.158 | $2.38 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.62 \mathrm{E}-01$ |  |
| PR $\eta=30$ | 0.769 | 0.046 | $1.68 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $3.94 \mathrm{E}-01$ |  |

$\eta$ is the weight we put on prejudice regularizers ${ }_{\text {Kamishima et al, } 2012}$

## Results

- $\mathrm{Pl} / \mathrm{MI}$
- Prejudice Index / Mutual Information
- Demonstrates a trade-offs between model fairness and performance
- Measures the amount of discrimination we eliminate with one unit of performance gain (measured by MI)

|  | method | Acc | NMI | NPI | PI/MI |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| full fet. <br> Logistic Regression no sensitive fet. | LR | 0.851 | 0.267 | $5.21 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $2.10 \mathrm{E}-01$ |
|  | LRns | 0.850 | 0.266 | $4.91 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.99 \mathrm{E}-01$ |
|  | PR $\eta=5$ | 0.842 | 0.240 | $4.24 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.91 \mathrm{E}-01$ |
| Logistic Regression + Prejudice Regularizer | PR $\eta=15$ | 0.801 | 0.158 | $2.38 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $1.62 \mathrm{E}-01$ |
|  | PR $\eta=30$ | 0.769 | 0.046 | $1.68 \mathrm{E}-02$ | $3.94 \mathrm{E}-01$ |

## Reading Assignments (Pick One)

- A. Beutel, J. Chen, Z. Zhao, and E. H. Chi, Data decisions and theoretical implications when adversarially learning fair representations, FAT 2017
- Kleinberg, Jon, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan. Inherent trade-offs in the fair determination of risk scores, ArXiv, 2016
- Depeng Xu, Shuhan Yuan, Lu Zhang, and Xintao Wu. Fairgan: Fairness-aware generative adversarial networks. IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data), 2018
- Creager, E., Madras, D., Jacobsen, J. H., Weis, M. A., Swersky, K., Pitassi, T., \& Zemel, R. Flexibly fair representation learning by disentanglement, ICML 2019
- Jiang, R., Pacchiano, A., Stepleton, T., Jiang, H., \& Chiappa, S. Wasserstein Fair Classification. UAI, 2019

Next Lecture

## Interpretability and Transparency

## Questions?

